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ELKINS v. UNITED STATES: AN EXTENSION OF THE
FEDERAL RULE OF EXCLUSION
In a recent case, Elkins v. United States,1 the Supreme Court of the
United States enlarged the federal rule of exclusion for illegally obtained
evidence. The case arose when Oregon state police searched the home of one
Clark for the purpose of confiscating obscene motion pictures which they
had reason to believe were on the premises. Instead of the obscene motion
pictures the police found wiretap equipment and recordings which indicated
that the equipment may have been used in violation of the state communications statute. After an indictment by a state grand jury, the local district
court held that the evidence was illegally seized and granted defendant's
motion to suppress it. The local district attorney challenged the power of
the court to suppress evidence after an indictment was in. During subsequent state proceedings but prior to final state judicial determination, federal
officials, acting under a federal search warrant, obtained the paraphernalia
from the state officials. Immediately after the state dropped the case, federal
officials indicted the defendant for the violation of and conspiracy to violate
the Federal Communications Act. 2 Before trial in the United States District
Court of Oregon, defendant moved to have the evidence excluded on the
grounds that it was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure by
state and federal officials. The district court denied the motion without
determining the legality of the seizure by the state officials and held that,
since federal agents had not participated in the search and had neither
knowledge, nor information, nor suspicion that the search was being contemplated, the evidence was admissible. This decision was upheld by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.3 Upon appeal to the Supreme Court
4
of the United States, this decision was reversed by a divided Court.
(Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan and Whittaker dissenting.)
In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court enlarged an
evidentiary rule of law established almost fifty years ago in Weeks v. United
1.
2.
U.S.C.
3.
4.
dissent

80 Sup. Ct. 1437 (1960).
47 U.S.C. §§ 501, 605 (1954) (violation of the Communications Act); 18
§ 371 (1948) (conspiracy to commit any offense against the United States).
266 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1959).
Elkins v. United States, 80 Sup. Ct. 1453; this dissenting opinion was also the
for Rios v. United States, 80 Sup. Ct. 1431 (1960).
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5

States. Though the rule excluding evidence which had been acquired
through an illegal search and seizure had been discussed in the dictum of an
earlier case,6 it was not clearly established until the Weeks decision. In
Weeks, it was held that the fourth amendment to the Federal Constitution
should be enforced (against federal officials) by having evidence obtained in
an illegal search and seizure excluded in a federal criminal prosecution.
7
This doctrine became known as the federal rule of exclusion.
This rule of exclusion as established by the Weeks case did not apply
to state officials, for a second principle laid down was that the fourth
amendment applied only to the federal government and its agencies. Hence,
the federal courts did not have to take cognizance of the illegality of the
search or seizure by state officials in a federal criminal prosecution. This
gave rise to the "silver platter" doctrine,8 whereby evidence illegally seized
by state officials could be handed over on a "silver platter" for use in a
federal criminal prosecution. However, two restrictions on this doctrine
remained: federal agents could not participate in an illegal search9 and state
officials could not illegally search "solely on behalf" of the United States.10
A breach of either of these restrictions constituted a violation of the fourth
amendment and the exclusionary rule was applicable.
This was the law until 1960. However, the foundation for its abolition
was established in 1949 in Wolf v. Colorado." In that case, the Supreme
Court of the United States construed the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment so that an illegal search and seizure by state officers was a
violation of the Federal Constitution. The facts giving rise to the case
occurred when local officials illegally seized two day-books from the offices
of a local physician and used them as evidence in a state criminal prosecution for conspiracy to commit abortion. A conviction was obtained and subsequently was affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court. 12 Upon appeal to
5. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
7. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944) ; see also, McCORMICK, EviDENCE, §§ 139 and 140 (1954).
8. The doctrine was so labeled in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 at 79
(1949).
9. For varying degrees of participation see: Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28
(1927) (state and federal officials acting jointly); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S.
310 (1927) (federal officials instigated search by tacit general agreement) ; Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (mere notorious practice of using evidence seized by
others insufficient to render the evidence inadmissible).

10. In Gambino v. United States, supra note 9, state officials seized liquor from
defendant's automobile and the prosecution sought to use this evidence. The Court
held the evidence inadmissible since at the time of the search and seizure there was
no indication that defendants were committing a state offense, therefore, the illegal
search and seizure was conducted solely on behalf of the United States.
11. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
12. Wolf v. People, 117 Colo. 279, 187 P.2d 926 (1947).
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the Supreme Court of the United States, the issue presented for judicial
determination was: Does the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protect the individual from state action in the form of an illegal search
and seizure? In answering in the affirmative, Justice Frankfurter, speaking
for the majority of the Court said: "The security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in the 'concept of
ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the states through the
Due Process Clause. 13 In holding that the rights granted under the fourth
amendment were in substance included in the fourteenth amendment, the
Court by implication struck down the "silver platter" doctrine.
Since the "silver platter" doctrine rested upon the fact that the federal
courts did not have to take cognizance of the illegality of searches and
seizures by state officials, participation by federal officers was the crucial
test applied to state-seized evidence in a federal criminal prosecution. Prior
to the Wolf case, federal courts concerned themselves only with this participation-if federal agents had participated in the search, the next inquiry was
to the legality of the search; but if federal agents had not participated in the
search, the evidence was admissible. Under the Wolf decision, the legality of
the state search and seizure became an imperative inquiry, for thereafter
an illegal search and seizure was deemed violative of the fourteenth amendment. It became incumbent upon federal courts to consider the legality of
any search and seizure which yielded evidence to be used in a federal
criminal proceeding without regard to participation by federal officials.
Since state-seized evidence could no longer be used in a federal criminal
prosecution without judicial scrutiny, it would seem then, that the "silver
platter" doctrine no longer existed. But only recently in the Elkins case,
decided June 27, 1960, did the Court explicitly declare its non-existence.
By so doing, the Court was faced with a problem: the admissibility of
evidence in the federal courts seized in violation of the Federal Constitution
by state officials. To be logically consistent there was only one solution to
the problem before the Court-namely, to extend the rule excluding evidence illegally seized by federal officials to include evidence seized illegally
by state officials.
The Court provided that state officials procuring evidence to be used in
a federal criminal prosecution must adhere to the standard of conduct established for federal officials by the fourth amendment. To determine whether
the standard has been met is a question which must be finally resolved by
the federal courts. Hence, the federal courts "must make an independent
13.

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 27.
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inquiry [since] the test is one of federal law."14 Recognizing the dangers
and gravity of a rule that would exclude competent and relevant evidence of
a crime, the Court stated the basis underlying the exclusionary rule: "The
rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available wayby removing the incentive to disregard it."'u It appears that the primary aim
of the Court is to deter police officials from unreasonably invading the
privacy of individuals and thereby infringing upon the rights guaranteed by
the Federal Constitution. With the incentive for illegal searches and seizures
eliminated, overzealous state officials would find themselves wasting time and
effort while acquiring incriminating evidence by an illegal search.
However, it must also be recognized that public opinion is an effective
control on the conduct of local officials because the community will not
tolerate oppressive acts. This is the regulatory function of public opinion
referred to by Justice Frankfurter in Wolf v. Colorado.'6 Though this public
opinion is effective in a given locale, it is doubtful whether it has much force
at the federal level, for these prosecutions are far removed from the attention
of the general public. In addition, any misconduct in obtaining evidence for a
federal criminal prosecution is unlikely to be widely noticed. It should also
be recognized that state officials are presented with a very limited number
of opportunities to acquire evidence for use in a federal criminal prosecution.
This fact limits the opportunities for the general public to exert any regulatory pressure on state officials who abuse their authority. Therefore, control
by the federal judiciary seems to be the only effective means of deterring
illegal searches and seizures on the federal court level.
Moreover, the Court recognized that the exclusionary rule prior to the
Elkins case tended to discourage free and open cooperation between federal
and state law enforcement agencies. Rather than risk being declared "participants" and having incriminating evidence excluded, federal agents found
it advantageous to withdraw from open alliances with state agencies. Actually,
the rule, through the "silver platter" doctrine, operated as an inducement for
subterfuge by overzealous federal officials to obscure their participation in
questionable searches and seizures. For it would be a relatively simple matter,
if they were so inclined, for federal agents to make clandestine agreements
with state officials to procure illegally-seized evidence for use in a federal
criminal prosecution. The Court must have also realized the extreme burden
of showing "participation" when, in fact, the officials had engaged in
14.
15.

Elkins v. United States, 80 Sup. Ct. at 1447.
Id. at 1444.

16. One of the reasons given for not requiring the adoption of the exclusionary
rule by states in order to assure due process of law was that public opinion is an effective control at this level. See Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 11, at 32.
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subterfuge. The exclusionary rule, as extended by Elkins, removes this impediment and invites forthright cooperation between the two agencies, for
now participation is no longer an issue as previously indicated. Such open
cooperation will result in the increased efforts by the two agencies to procure
evidence without the taint of illegality and thereby accomplish the aim of
the Court.
Commentators and legal scholars may argue the relative merits of the
exclusionary rule,' 7 but the position of the Court is very clear in that it refuses to become "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a constitution
(it) is sworn to uphold"' 8 by admitting into evidence the fruits of an illegal
search and seizure. The dissenting opinion of the Elkins case stated the basic
objection to the rule-"the underlying aim of judicial inquiry is ascertainable
truth, everything rationally related to ascertaining truth is presumptively
admissible."' 9 The Court, while seeking just and expeditious fulfillment of
criminal investigation and law enforcement, nevertheless refused to sacrifice
basic human rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
HARRY SCHOOLITZ, JR.

17. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940), § 2184; ALLEN, The Wolf Case: Search
and Seizure, Federalism and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REV. 1, 14-25; Comment,
Judicial Control of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L.J. 144.
18. Elkins v. United States, supra note 14.
19. Elkins v. United States, 80 Sup. Ct. at 1454.

THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR IN ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
When abandonment of a child by its parents is established, or absolute
consent to adopt is given by them, what role should religion play in determining the suitability of the adopting parents? Should the religion of the adopting parents and the child always be identical? Or should other factors outweigh this under certain circumstances? Natural rights of the blood parents
versus "the welfare of the child" is the crux of the problem. In an attempt
to solve this problem, some states have enacted statutes which require the
courts to consider the religious factor in adoption proceedings.' In 1953,
Pennsylvania enacted a statute of this type, providing: "Whenever possible,
the petitioners shall be of the same religious faith as the natural parents of
the child to be adopted." 2
Stone Adoption Case3 was the first Pennsylvania decision to construe
this section of the statute. In this case baby girl Stone had been reared for
over two years by petitioners with much "love and care." The conflict arose
from the fact that the petitioners were of the Jewish faith and the natural
mother was Protestant. Upon appeal from the original proceedings, in
which adoption was denied because consent to adopt had not been given
and abandonment was not established, 4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
found abandonment and remanded the case stating the religious factor had
not been resolved. 5 Subsequently, adoption was granted on the ground that
the two year period of togetherness, the "love and care" bestowed on the
child during that time, and the financial means of petitioners outweighed the
diversity of religion.
The courts have generally considered three norms in deciding whether
or not to decree adoption in a particular case. Where abandonment of the
child by its parents has been established, the parents' fundamental right to
control their child's education is given effect only by providing that the
child's religion is deemed to be that of the parent. 6 Another norm is that
the decree of adoption should promote the best interests of the child with
1.

DEL. LAWS 1951, c. 134, § 3; R.I. LAWS 1944, c. 1441, § 26 as amended, R.I.
1946, c. 1772, § 1; N.Y. Soc. WEL. LAW § 373 (1924); Mo. REV. STAT. § 392
(1939) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1 (1953) ; ILL. REV. STAT. C. 4, § 42 (1953).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1 (1953).
3. 57 Lancaster L. Rev. 51 (Pa. 1960).
4. Abandonment is an ultimate conclusion of fact; it is conduct on the part of the
parent evidencing a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to the child and of
not performing parental duties for a period of at least six months. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
1, § 1 et seq. (1953).
5. Stone Adoption Case, 398 Pa. 190, 156 A.2d 808 (1959). The court also
indicated that the abandonment period could only be broken by the bringing of a habeas
corpus action.
6. Matter of Santos, 278 App. Div. 373, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1951) ; discussed in
65 HARV. L. REV. 694 (1952) and 54 COL. L. REV. 376, 378 (1954).
LAWS
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the religion merely being one factor in arriving at a final decision. The third
basic norm is that the principle of religious freedom prevents the courts, as
political organs of the state, from heeding religious differences. It is by a
judicial balancing of these norms, in accordance with the particular facts of
7
a given case, that the courts have sought to solve this problem.
Other courts have faced the same problem as the lower court in the
Stone case when construing comparable adoption statutes. An Illinois court,
in construing a statute similar to the Pennsylvania statute, reached the same
decision in Cooper v. Hinrick8 as the court did in the Stone case. As the
basis for its decision, the court stated: "the polestar ... has always been the
welfare and best interests of the child . .. [and] identity of religion between

the child and the adoptive parents is a significant and desirable but not an
exclusive factor to be considered by the court in the exercise of its discretion." 9 However, a Massachusetts statute, similar to those of Pennsylvania
and Illinois except where it provides that "whenever practicable [the adoption] must be decreed,"' 0 has been interpreted as being mandatory."
(Emphasis added.) The court gave two basic reasons for its decision:
(1) Even though the mother consented to placing the children in a Jewish
home and having them reared in the Jewish faith, the statute contemplates
the welfare of the children after adoption and therefore the best interests
of the children are determinative.
(2) "There are .. .many Catholic couples of fine family life and excellent
reputation who have filed applications . . . for the purpose of adopting

Catholic children of the type of the twins, and are able to provide the twins
with a material status equivalent to or better than that of petitioners ... .
Hence, it can be stated that the statutory language will relegate the importance of religion in an adoption decree.
The efficacy of such a decree must nevertheless be tested from the
viewpoint of the child, the natural parents, and religion. Most courts
would probably agree that the best interests of the child should be paramount
in making the award. In this respect the disagreement is not over the preferable result, but rather in determining how "the best interests of the child" is
to be interpreted and in ascertaining how to best realize this objective.
Although the law must ignore the possibility that one religion rather
7. See 54 COL. L,REV. 376, 377 (1954).
8. 10 Ill. 2d 269, 140 N.E.2d 293 (1957) discussing ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 4, § 4-2
(1953).
9. Cooper v. Hinricks, 10 Ill. 2d 269, -, 140 N.E.2d 293, 297 (1957).
10. MAss. LAWs ANN. c. 210, § 5B (1950).
11. Petitions of Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954).
12. Id. at -, 121 N.E.2d at 844-845. The New York position tends toward that
taken by Massachusetts: Matter of Santos, supra note 6; In re Maxwell's Adoption, 4
N.Y.2d 429, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281, 151 N.E.2d 848 (1958).
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than another may better further the spiritual salvation of the child,'1 the
child's psychological make-up is deeply affected by its religion. 4 Hence, the
"best interests" of the child are very much affected by the religious factor
unless it can be said that it would not be psychologically detrimental for the
child to be reared in a new religion or in none at all.' 5 Indeed, the probability of serious mental disturbance might require temporary placement of
the child in an institution of his religion rather than with a family of a
different religion.' 6 Of course, the age of the child at the time of this
change in environment is material.
Another consideration for testing the efficacy of the decree is the parental
right theory. Should this theory be strictly. applied to the point of excluding
adoptions by those of a different religion from that of the child? But is it
not always best for the child to be trained in the religion of his natural
parents? If we answer "no" to the latter question, should we then distinguish
between those children formally inducted into a religion, as in baptism, and
those not so inducted? A problem exists if baptism is made determinative of
a child's faith. Emphasis upon this factor might tend to favor those
religions in which faith is determined by baptism as compared to those who
view a child's faith as purely derivative until the child is able to understand
and accept church doctrines.' 7 Perhaps one might see as the solution a
conditioned decree requiring the adopting parents to rear the child in his
faith rather than their own.' 8 But this result does not seem likely; and, if it
were attempted, the training would not be as adequate as that received from
"parents" of the same religious faith. As a result, psychological problems
might also be presented here.
If we now concede that, in some cases, the temporal well-being should
outweigh the religious factor, of what must this "well-being" consist? In
several cases the child has been in the home of petitioners for one, two or
three years prior to the decree, 19 which contributes to the "love and affection"
as mentioned in the Stone case. 20 There may also be times when other qualified families of the same religious background are not available. It is sug13. In re Doyle, 16 Mo. App. 159 (1884).
14. Religion and Custody, 95 SoL. J. 325 (1951).
15. See: In re Waite, 190 Iowa 182, 187, 180 N.W. 159, 160 (1920) ; Leinke N.
Guthmann, 105 Neb. 251, 253, 181 N.W. 132 (1920).
16. Hernandez N. Thomas, 50 Fla. 522, 39 So. 641 (1905) ; In re Cunningham, 61
N.J. Eq. 454, 48 Ati. 391 (Ch. 1901).
17. See 65 HARV. L. REV. 694 (1952).
18. E.g. Lemke N. Guthmann, 105 Neb. 251, 181 N.W. 132 (1920) ; cf. Guardianship of Bynum, 72 Cal. App. 2d 120, 164 P.2d 25 (1945). But see In re Flynn, 87
N.J. Eq. 413, 423, 100 At. 861, 865 (Ch. 1917) questioning a court's power to condition
decrees of custody.

19. Stone Adoption Case, supra note 3; Cooper v. Hinricks, supra note 9; In re
Maxwell's Adoption, supra note 12.
20. 57 Lancaster L. Rev. 51 (Pa. 1960).
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gested, under these circumstances, that the Stone case represents an appropriate disposition. However, in those cases where a family of the same
religion is available, the "well being" of a child would seem to require that
the religious factor outweigh the circumstances giving rise to "love and
affection."
Beyond the psychological and other problems already discussed, there
is a constitutional issue facing the statutory solutions. It was mentioned
in a Massachusetts case when the petitioners contended that the statute
was unconstitutional as a law "respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," contrary to the first amendment to
the Constitution of the United States. 21 However, this contention was rejected by the Massachusetts court 22 as was a petition to the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.23 This summary decision appears
to have foreclosed the possibility that the contention urged by petitioners
will be accepted by the United States Supreme Court in the immediate future.
In view of the Stone case, 24 is the Pennsylvania statute unconstitutional
as evidencing undue state support of religion? Or does the fact that the
statute is discretionary on this point remove this objection because consideration of the religious factor is deemed to be an appropriate government recognition of religion? At present the latter must be answered in the affirmative.
Consequently, the Pennsylvania courts are to be confronted in the future
with the seemingly simple norms and tests already discussed while at the
same time trying to use them to reach the most just result in the particular
case. Some attempt to achieve predictability in the law of this area must be
made even though one might be forced to adopt the mandatory Massachusetts view, which may perhaps be the best solution to the problem. The
religion of a child of tender years should be preserved as long as a family
of adequate temporal means, of the same religion, is ready and willing to
adopt the child.
SAMUEL

21.

Petitions of Goldman, supra note 11.

22.

Ibid.

23. 348 U.S. 942 (1954).
24. 57 Lancaster L. Rev. 51 (Pa. 1960).

A.

LITZENBERGER

WARRANTY LIABILITY OF A MANUFACTURER IN
NEW JERSEY
In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,' the New Jersey Supreme
Court has dealt what appears to be a crippling blow to the common law
requirement of privity of contract with respect to potentially dangerous instrumentalities, thereby removing the manufacturer from his lofty pedestal
of immunity from warranty liability.
Although privity is still a requirement in the large majority of jurisdictions when basing liability upon a warranty, 2 the modern trend is away
from a strict adherence to this doctrine. 3 The landmark case of MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co. 4 seriously threatened the efficacy of the privity rule when
New York's highest court held that an injured buyer could sue a manufacturer on a negligence theory in the absence of privity of contract. More
recently, many courts, dictated by the demands of public policy, have held
that cases involving food commodities which the retailer cannot reasonably
inspect need not comply with the privity requirement when asserting liability
under the warranty doctrine.5 In fact, this limited field is now recognized
as an exception to the general rule. 6 A small minority of jurisdictions, sensing
the illogical distinction between the food cases and those of certain potentially
dangerous commodities, have applied the reasoning of the food cases to
other areas. 7 Among these minority decisions, the Henningsen case must be
recognized as revolutionary for its powerful reasoning and for the mass of
litigation which it forecasts for one of our largest industries.
In the Henningsen case the action was brought by the purchaser of an
automobile and his wife against the manufacturer of the vehicle and the
dealer for injuries sustained by the wife while she was driving the allegedly
defective automobile. The plaintiffs based their suit on the grounds of negli1. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
2. PROSSER, TORTS, § 84 (2d ed. 1955) ; 27 U. CIN. L. REV. 124 (1958). See, e.g.,
Green v. Equitable Powder Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 126 (W.D. Ark. 1950); Barni v.
Kutner, 6 Del. 550, 7 A.2d 801 (1950) ; Prater v. Campbell, 110 Ky. L. Rep. 23,
60 S.W. 918 (1901); Poplar v. Hochschild, 180 Md. 389, 24 A.2d 783 (1942) ; Odom
v. Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956).

3. See 2
(1958).

HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS,

§ 28.1 (1956) ; 13 U.

MIAMI

L.

REV.

252

4. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
5. Davis v. VanCamp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920) ; Catani
v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 Atl. 931 (1915) ; Parks v. C. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan.
334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914). See also Annot., 142 A.L.R. 1490, 1494-1495 (1943).
6. See 9 SYRACUSE L. REV. 326 (1958) ; 46 HARV. L. REV. 161 (1958) ; 31 TEMP.
L.Q. 62 (1957).
7. Mannsz v. MacWhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946) (defective rope);
Divello v. Gardner Mach. Co., - Ohio -, 102 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio C.P. 1951) (defective grinding wheel) ; Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d
421, 37 A.L.R.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1953) (inflammable cowboy suit).
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gence and implied warranty. The lower court held that there was not enough
evidence to submit the negligence charge to the jury. Nevertheless, it allowed
the jury to decide the question of whether or not there was an implied
warranty. After a verdict for the plaintiffs, the manufacturer, Chrysler Corporation, and the dealer appealed. The matter was certified by the supreme
court prior to consideration in the intermediate appellate division.
In affirming the verdict of the lower court, the New Jersey Supreme
Court made significant rulings on two separate questions of law. The court
held that neither Henningsen nor his wife would be precluded from warranty protection by the absence of privity with Chrysler Corporation. Secondly, a uniform warranty disclaimer clause, used successfully by automobile
manufacturers, would not avoid the plaintiffs' count of implied warranty.
In holding that lack of privity does not preclude warranty relief in suits
against automobile manufacturers, the New Jersey Court does not indulge in
any of the legal fictions often employed by courts desirous of eluding the
privity barrier. 8 Justice Francis, speaking for the court, stated that the
complexity of the modern commercial world has given the manufacturer an
all too powerful bargaining power over the buyer. Modern marketing
methods have caused the disappearance of "face-to-face" bargaining, which
was the sole type of sale when the doctrine of caveat emptor was popular,9
and have brought about mass advertising which has caused the buyer to
rely on the representations of a seller whom he never confronts. 10 Moreover,
the court was strongly influenced by the fact that the manufacturer has been
able to maintain an almost unassailable immunity by selling to a dealer, thus
avoiding privity of contract with the ultimate consumer."' Finally, it was
the apparent social need to protect the buyer that brought the New Jersey
court to conclude:
We see no rational doctrinal basis for differentiating between a fly
in a bottle of beverage and a defective automobile. The unwholesome beverage may bring illness to one person, the defective car,
with its great potentiality for harm to the driver, occupants, and
others, 2demands even less adherence to the narrow barrier of

privity.1

The New Jersey court went even further in holding that the wife, in
8. In Coca Cola Bottling Wks. v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927), the
theory is advanced that the original warranty runs with the title as in a conveyance of
land. In Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1943), the implied
warranty was treated as an express warranty, thereby avoiding the privity requirement.
In Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 Ill. App. 305, 47 N.E.2d 739 (App. Ct. 1933), the
third party beneficiary thesis provides the basis for disregarding the lack of privity.
9. See 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS, 28.1 (1956).
10. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. at -, 161 A.2d at 80.
11. Id. at-,
161 A.2d at 81.
12. Id. at -, 161 A.2d at 83.
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no way connected with the sale, could sue under an implied warranty. In
deducing that the manufacturer should reasonably expect others to drive the
car, the court suggests that not only the owner's family but his friends as
13
well should be protected by the implied warranty doctrine.
Though the court's holding with regard to privity is indeed significant,
the most difficult obstacle the New Jersey tribunal had to overcome in reaching its final decision was a disclaimer and limitation of warranty clause in
the contract, which is used by almost all automobile manufacturers. The
warranty clause provided that the manufacturer would replace any defective
part if the buyer mailed the part prepaid to the manufacturer and examination by the latter showed to his satisfaction that the part was defective. This
clause further provided for the exclusion "of all other obligations and liabilities on its part."'1 4 In an effort to avoid this very explicit provision, the
New Jersey court utilizes the legal doctrines of strict construction of warranties against their maker and unconscionable contract provisions.' 5 However, it is apparent that both of these tenets are ineffective in their application
to the warranty clause in question because of its verbal clarity and bold-faced
inclusion in the sales contract. 6 Actually, it is the abuse of the sellermanufacturer's superior bargaining power over the buyer, by giving the buyer
only illusory warranty relief, that echoes throughout Justice Francis' opinion
and leads the court to discount the warranty provision.' 7 It is evident that
even the court seems dissatisfied with its own legal arguments, when Justice
Francis stated:
The task of the judiciary is to administer the spirit as well as the
13. Id. at -, 161 A.2d at 100. In the recent case of Faber v. Greswick, 32 N.J.
234, 156 A.2d 252 (1959). the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the wife of a lessee
could recover for injuries from the lessor arising from a breach of a covenant to have
the premises in good repair, although she -'as not a party to the lease.
14. Id. at -,161 A.2d at 80.
15. Id. at -. 161 A.2d at 86-94.
16. The disclaimer clause was set out on the reverse side of the sales contract and
contained 8% inches of print which was divided into 10 paragraphs totaling 65 lines.
Paragraph 7, which was the focal point of the case, reads as follows: "7. It is expressly agreed that there are no warranties, express or implied, made by either the
dealer or manufacturer on the motor vehicle, chassis, of parts furnished hereunder
except as follows. The manufacturer warrants each new motor vehicle (including
original equipment placed thereon by the manufacturer except tires), chassis or parts
manufactured by it to be free from defects in material or workmanship under normal
use and service. Its obligation under this warranty being limited to making good at its
factory any part thereof which shall, within ninety (90) days after delivery of such
vehicle to the original purchaser or before such vehicle has been driven 4,000 miles,
whichever event shall first occur, be returned to it with transportation charges prepaid
and which its examination shall disclose to its satisfaction to have been thus defective;
this warranty being expressly in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied, and
all other obligations or liabilities on its part, and it neither assumes nor authorizes
any other person to assume for it any other liability in connection with the sale of its
vehicles." Id. at -, 161 A.2d at 74.
17. Id. at -, 161 A.2d at 94.
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letter of the law. On issues such as the present one, part of the
burden is to protect the ordinary man against the loss of important
rights through, what, in effect, is the unilateral act of the manufacturer.18
Upon analysis, it is the strong public policy in favor of the buyer and a
sweeping use of the court's broad discretion, not the technical legal arguments, that enable this highest New Jersey court to hold the disclaimer clause
void.1 9

Finally, consideration must be given to the impact of this decision and
the manner in which it drastically alters the position of the buyer and the
seller. In his opinion, Justice Francis states that the reason for the trend
towards a liberalization of the common law privity requirement is motivated
in part by the desire "to ameliorate the harsh doctrine of caveat emptor, and
' ' 20
in some measure to impose a reciprocal obligation on the seller to beware.
There can be no doubt that the Henningsen case has shifted a burden to
the seller. But, could it not be possible that this liberal New Jersey court
has tipped the scales so heavily against the manufacturer that the buyer need
no longer beware and the manufacturer is entirely unprotected? Will there
not follow a mass of litigation with the possibility of false or unfounded
claims against which the manufacturer has inadequate defenses? On the
other hand, is this rejection of the privity doctrine anything more than
another example of a progressive court abolishing an old common law rule
which has lost all of its original purpose in a changed society? Whatever
the answers to these queries, there can be no doubt that the privity holding,
coupled with the even more devastating voidance of the disclaimer clause,
place the Henningsen case at the fore-front in the modern trend towards
more protection for the buyer.
THEODORE PARSONS

18. Ibid.
19. The court states at 94-95; "Public policy is a term not easily defined. Its
significance varies as the habits and needs of people may vary. It is not static and the
field of application is an ever increasing one. A contract, or a particular provision there-

in, valid in one era may be wholly opposed to the public policy of another. . . . Courts
keep in mind the principle that the best interests of society demand that people should
not be unnecessarily restricted in their freedom to contract. But they do not hesitate
to declare void as against public policy contractual provisions which clearly tend to

the injury of the public in some way." (Emphasis added.)
20. Id. at -, 161 A.2d at 77.

